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CARRYING FIREARMS AT POLITICAL 
DEMONSTRATIONS 
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ABSTRACT 
  Armed protest has long been a tool of American political groups. 
Neo-Nazis, socialists, fascists, antifascists, the Black Panthers, neo-
Confederates, and others have all taken up arms not necessarily to do 
violence, but to do politics. But such protests always risk rending a 
violent hole in our social fabric. If war is politics by other means, armed 
protests erase the distinction. 
  This Note argues that the Constitution’s relevant guarantees of 
individual rights—the First and Second Amendments—do not include 
a constitutional right to armed protest.  
  With respect to free speech, it is unlikely that current doctrine would 
cover armed protests. But, considering ongoing First Amendment 
expansion, this Note argues for a categorical exclusion of guns, and 
perhaps other express constitutional guarantees, from expressive 
conduct doctrine. 
  As for the Second Amendment, armed protest is not within the 
historically understood scope of the right to keep and bear arms. More 
importantly, though, Heller’s “sensitive places” exception recognizes a 
fundamental reality about the relationship between the First and 
Second Amendments: the Second Amendment must cede certain 
arenas—churches, government buildings, schools, theaters, protests, 
and the like—to the First. Instruments of violence cannot be permitted 
to distort outcomes in the marketplace of ideas. 
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“Don’t take your guns to town, son 
Leave your guns at home, Bill 
Don’t take your guns to town.” 
- Johnny Cash1 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 12, 2017, a group of white nationalists gathered in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, to protest the impending removal of a statue 
of Robert E. Lee from Emancipation Park.2 One of the largest 
gatherings of white supremacists in modern history,3 the event brought 
together groups like Identity Evropa,4 the National Socialist 
Movement,5 and Vanguard America,6 among others. Despite the 
groups’ violent ideologies, one rally leader, Christopher Cantwell, 
claimed the hallowed mantle of the lawful protestor: “We’re here 
obeying the law. We’re doing everything that we’re supposed to do, 
trying to express opinions.”7 
 
 1. JOHNNY CASH, Don’t Take Your Guns To Town, on THE FABULOUS JOHNNY CASH 
(Columbia Records 1958). 
 2. Jacey Fortin, The Statue at the Center of Charlottesville’s Storm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-rally-protest-statue.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/T7XR-QDER]. Emancipation Park was previously named Lee Park. Id. 
 3. Patrick Strickland, Unite the Right: White Supremacists Rally in Virginia, AL JAZEERA 
(Aug. 13, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/unite-white-supremacists-rally-virginia-
170812142356688.html [https://perma.cc/9A49-G2LN]. 
 4. See Identity Evropa, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (last visited Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.adl.org/education/resources/profiles/identity-evropa [https://perma.cc/9B76-H9PZ] 
(describing the group as “focused on the preservation of ‘white American culture’ and promoting 
white European identity”). 
 5. See National Socialist Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (last visited Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/national-socialist-movement 
[https://perma.cc/B8XF-A5GP] (“[T]he National Socialist Movement (NSM) is one of the largest 
and most prominent neo-Nazi groups in the United States.”). 
 6. See Vanguard America, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (last visited Dec. 14, 2017), 
https://www.adl.org/education/resources/backgrounders/vanguard-america [https://perma.cc/ 
7FVU-WH8U] (“VA is a white supremacist group that opposes multiculturalism and believes 
America should be an exclusively white nation.”). 
 7. VICE, Charlottesville: Race and Terror – VICE News Tonight on HBO, YOUTUBE (Aug. 
14, 2017) [hereinafter Charlottesville: Race and Terror], https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=RIrcB1sAN8I [https://perma.cc/7V48-8GPF]; see also First Amended Complaint for 
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 65–66, City of Charlottesville v. Pa. Light Foot Militia, No. 
CL 17000560-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Charlottesville Jan. 4, 2018), available at http:// 
www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/constitutional-advocacy-protection/ 
upload/charlottesville-complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE6C-765F] (compiling similar 
statements about the First Amendment and free speech from groups associated with the protest). 
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Unsurprisingly, that wasn’t the full story. Just seconds later, 
Cantwell remarked: “We’re not non-violent. We’ll fucking kill these 
people if we have to.”8 After retreating from the Lee statue, another 
white nationalist threatened “to send at least 200 people with guns” 
back to the statue.9 There was nothing necessarily illegal about a plan 
to march 200 armed protestors onto government property. Virginia is 
an open-carry state;10 most people11 can legally carry most weapons12 in 
most places.13 In addition to invoking the First Amendment, the white 
supremacists operated under a permissive interpretation of the 
Second.14 
Activists on the left, arriving to counter-protest, did not bring an 
olive branch to a gun fight. Armed antifascists (“antifa”)—including 
Redneck Revolt, “a pro-worker, anti-racist organization” that 
practices “armed community defense”15—stood ready with openly 
displayed assault weapons.16 Were it not for antifa, Dr. Cornel West 
said from the scene, community members and clergy “would have been 
crushed like cockroaches.”17  
Thus, Charlottesville was simultaneously occupied by armed 
fascists and armed antifascists. Even though each group operated with 
 
 8. Charlottesville: Race and Terror, supra note 7. 
 9. Id. 
 10. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-279 to 18.2-311.2 (2017). 
 11. Id. §§ 18.2-308.1:1 to 18.2-308.1:5, 18.2-308.2:01 & 18.2-308.7 (prohibiting certain classes 
of persons from possessing firearms). 
 12. Id. §§ 18.2-288 to 18.2-298 (banning machine guns), 18.2-299 to 18.2-307 (banning sawed-
off shotguns and rifles) & 18.2-308.5 (banning plastic firearms). 
 13. Id. §§ 18.2-283 (prohibiting firearms in a house of worship), 18.2-283.1 (prohibiting 
firearms in courthouses), 18.2-287.01 (prohibiting firearms in airport terminals) & 18.2-287.4 
(prohibiting open carry in certain cities). 
 14. See JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT 
6–7 (2018) (explaining the importance of distinguishing between what the Second Amendment 
requires and what it allows). 
 15. REDNECK REVOLT: ABOUT, http://www.Redneckrevolt.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/
E8TU-Y7ET] (last visited Dec. 14, 2017). 
 16. David A. Graham, Could Police Have Prevented Bloodshed in Charlottesville?, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/could-the-
police-have-prevented-bloodshed-in-charlottesville/536775/ [https://perma.cc/B6PJ-NBFA].  
 17. Peter Hermann, Joe Heim & Ellie Silverman, Police in Charlottesville Criticized for Slow 
Response to Violent Demonstrations, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2017, 7:41 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-charlottesville-police-response-20170812-
story.html [https://perma.cc/D5Q7-56SP]. 
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the implicit blessings of the first two amendments to the Constitution,18 
the outcome was disastrous.  
Heather Heyer, an unarmed counter-protester, was killed when 
James Alex Fields—photographed earlier bearing the Vanguard 
America insignia19—rammed his car into a crowd.20 The attack injured 
19 others.21 Two police officers, Lt. H. Jay Cullen and Trooper Berke 
M.M. Bates, died when the helicopter they were using to monitor the 
clashing factions crashed.22 In addition to these three deaths, at least 
thirty-five people were injured in the day’s violence.23 
It is almost miraculous that the violence was not much worse. 
Somehow, no one was shot, although one white supremacist fired his 
gun near a group of counter-protestors.24 But the specter of what might 
have happened does not lessen the tragedy of what did happen. Blood 
was shed because the deterrent effect of militia weaponry25 bought the 
far right enough breathing room to inflict violence on innocent 
 
 18. First Amendment protection was explicit for the white supremacist protesters. See 
Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, No. 3:17CV00056, 2017 WL 3474071, at *3 (W.D. Va. Aug. 11, 
2017) (rejecting Charlottesville’s attempt to stop the rally from happening). 
 19. Nicole Hensley, Charlottesville Crash Suspect James Fields Brandished Shield for 
Vanguard America Hate Group Before Attack, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 13, 2017, 9:09 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/charlottesville-suspect-held-hate-group-shield-
attack-article-1.3407245 [https://perma.cc/T7JB-6PF9]. Vanguard America denied any ties to 
Fields. Id. 
 20. Jonah Engel Bromwich & Alan Blinder, What We Know About James Alex Fields, Driver 
Charged in Charlottesville Killing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/13/us/james-alex-fields-charlottesville-driver-.html [https://perma.cc/999S-TY9E]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Matthew Haag, Death of 2 State Troopers Adds Another Layer of Tragedy in 
Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/virginia-
police-helicopter-crash.html [https://perma.cc/JP9R-VJ6G]. 
 23. Deadly Car Attack, Violent Clashes in Charlottesville: What We Know Now, USA TODAY 
(Aug. 13, 2017, 3:13 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/08/13/
charlottesville-protests-what-we-know-now/562911001/ [https://perma.cc/6Q5F-VXRT]. 
 24. Evan Simko-Bednarski, Man Arrested for Firing Gun at Charlottesville Rally, CNN (Aug. 
28, 2017, 9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/27/us/man-arrested-gun-charlottesville-
rally/index.html [https://perma.cc/8XHB-XA6L]. 
 25. In addition to the white supremacists who came to protest the statue’s removal, several 
right-wing militias attended the protests in an alleged attempt to protect the protestors’ right to 
free speech. The militias, who claimed to disavow the white supremacists’ message, were more 
heavily armed than the white supremacists. Joanna Walters, Militia Leaders Who Descended on 
Charlottesville Condemn ‘Rightwing Lunatics’, GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2017, 2:12 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/15/charlottesville-militia-free-speech-violence 
[https://perma.cc/ZUF2-VAX4].  
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people.26 The police either could not or would not intervene; the 
government was outgunned on American soil.27 
It is tempting to view Charlottesville apocalyptically—to see in the 
day’s violence a vision of the future where the government, hands tied 
by the First and Second Amendments, can take no action to prevent 
political violence. Such a view is already taking hold in some corners. 
The American Civil Liberties Union has engaged in public hand-
wringing over whether to continue representing such demonstrators.28 
At Slate, Dahlia Lithwick and Mark Joseph Stern offered a bleak 
rundown of the supposed clash between the First and Second 
Amendments in Charlottesville, declaring: “The Guns Won.”29 
But these concerns are unduly pessimistic. The First Amendment 
has survived gunfights before, and the Constitution does not prevent 
us from adequately responding to those who seek to dangerously 
combine guns and political expression. Ironically, the 19th-century 
prosecution of a socialist immigrant may help to illuminate the hard 
constitutional questions posed by 21st-century Nazis.  
The late 1800s were a hotbed of unrest. As the beleaguered nation 
emerged from the Civil War, industrialization began to work a massive 
transformation, fueled by a wave of cheap labor from European 
immigrants.30 The workers, not content to endure the brutal indignities 
of these early factories, formed unions and began to strike for fairer 
working conditions.31 In response, industrialists recruited private 
security forces and successfully lobbied the federal government to use 
 
 26. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Hurt and Angry, Charlottesville Tries to Regroup From Violence, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/us/charlottesville-protests-
white-nationalists.html [https://perma.cc/XFD7-LVCV]. 
 27. See id. (quoting Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffe’s claim that the militias were more 
heavily armed than the state police forces).  
 28. Joseph Goldstein, After Backing Alt-Right in Charlottesville, A.C.L.U. Wrestles With Its 
Role, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/nyregion/aclu-free-
speech-rights-charlottesville-skokie-rally.html [https://perma.cc/D5UC-7E4E]. 
 29. Dahlia Lithwick & Mark Joseph Stern, The First and Second Amendments Clashed in 
Charlottesville. The Guns Won, SLATE (Aug. 17, 2017, 7:34 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/08/the_first_and_second_amendments_clashed_in
_charlottesville_the_guns_won.html [https://perma.cc/Y9KG-PCHL]; see also Luppe B. Luppen 
(@nycsouthpaw), TWITTER (Sept. 2, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://twitter.com/nycsouthpaw/
status/1036328043474837504 [https://perma.cc/3LVF-RYEW] (“Where open carry was always 
headed, protests and counterprotests looking more and more like paramilitary shows of force. 
This is the America the NRA has made.”). 
 30. The Early Labor Movement, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/opb/historydetectives/feature/the-
early-labor-movement/ [https://perma.cc/WLU8-EHCC] (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 
 31. Id. 
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the national army to break strikes.32 Violence was common, with 
fatalities on both sides.33 
Following the 1874 creation of the Illinois National Guard34 (at the 
time, privately financed by wealthy businessmen),35 a group of German 
socialists in Chicago, opposed to a world where “police clubs and 
militia rifles outweighed the Constitution,”36 created the Lehr und 
Wehr Verein (“Education and Defense Association”).37 Its purpose was 
simple: “When the workingmen are on their guard, their just demands 
will not be answered with bullets.”38 
To wit, they armed themselves and marched.39 It was at the head 
of one such march on September 24, 1879, that Hermann Presser was 
arrested for violating the Illinois Military Code, enacted to prohibit the 
workers’ marches.40 Presser rode a horse and bore a cavalry sword 
while 400 of his comrades marched behind him with rifles.41 Ultimately, 
the Supreme Court rejected both First and Second Amendment 
defenses to Presser’s march.42 
As Charlottesville and Presser v. Illinois illustrate, the American 
practice of armed protest is neither exclusively modern nor exclusively 
 
 32. G. William Domhoff, The Rise and Fall of Labor Unions in the U.S., U.C. SANTA CRUZ 
(Feb. 2013), http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/history_of_labor_unions.html 
[https://perma.cc/AH72-PN4G] (“[C]orporate leaders put their efforts into creating stronger 
military forces to control workers . . . . [M]ilitia units were often directly funded and supplied by 
corporate leaders . . . . The regular army also developed close ties to the industrial 
companies . . . . The use of private security forces in labor disputes also grew.”). 
 33. Domhoff notes: 
American labor relations were the most violent in the Western world with the 
exception of Russia . . . . Between 1877 and 1900, American presidents sent the U.S. 
Army into 11 strikes, governors mobilized the National Guard in somewhere between 
118 and 160 labor disputes, and mayors called out the police on numerous occasions to 
maintain “public order.” 
Id. 
 34. Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of Workers to Assemble and to Bear Arms: Presser v. 
Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the States, 76 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 943, 946 (1999).  
 35. Id. at 946–47. 
 36. Id. at 950 (quoting Christine Heiss, German Radicals in Industrial America: The Lehr- 
und Wehr- Verein in Gilded Age Chicago, in GERMAN WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO 1850–
1910: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 215 (Hartmut Keil & John B. Jentz eds., 1983)). 
 37. Id. at 947. 
 38. Id. at 948 (quoting NATHAN FINE, LABOR AND FARMER PARTIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 1828–1928, at 106–07 (1928)). 
 39. See id. at 953–55 (describing Lehr und Wehr Verein marches). 
 40. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 253–54 (1886). 
 41. Id. at 254–55. 
 42. Id. at 269. The decision in Presser is discussed in greater detail infra Part II.B.1. 
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right wing. From socialists to fascists, from the Black Panthers43 to the 
Ku Klux Klan,44 from 19th-century workers fighting for dignity to 21st-
century 4chan posters aggrieved by diversity,45 Americans have always 
mixed guns and politics. In an era when both American guns and 
American politics seem more dangerous than ever,46 the question is 
whether this tradition remains viable. 
Commentators and civic associations question the sustainability of 
current jurisprudence, which, painting broadly, is protective of both 
guns and speech.47 Similarly, courts are faced with complaints like one 
filed by the City of Charlottesville,48 which alleged that the clashing 
protestors engaged in “unlawful paramilitary activity that transformed 
the city into a virtual combat zone.”49 
 
 43. See ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA 231 (2011) (“If it hadn’t been for the Black Panthers, a militant group of Marxist black 
nationalists committed to ‘Black Power,’ there might never have been a modern gun rights 
movement.”). 
 44.  See Alex Yablon, How to Keep Armed Militias Out of Your City, THE TRACE (Sept. 3, 
2018), https://www.thetrace.org/2018/09/armed-militias-right-wing-extremism-state-laws [https:// 
perma.cc/Y9L7-XHHW] (detailing “a 1979 incident in North Carolina, when neo-Nazis and Klan 
members armed with assault weapons attacked a Communist demonstration in the city of 
Greensboro, killing five leftists and injuring more than a dozen”). 
 45. The flag of “Kekistan,” popularized on 4chan, was flown at Charlottesville. See 
Hatewatch Staff, Flags and Other Symbols Used by Far-Right Groups in Charlottesville, S. 
POVERTY L. CTR. (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/08/12/flags-and-
other-symbols-used-far-right-groups-charlottesville [https://perma.cc/BWQ5-RRGC] (“The 
‘national flag of Kekistan’ mimics a German Nazi war flag . . . . A 4chan logo is emblazoned in 
the upper left hand corner. Alt-righters are particularly fond of the way the banner trolls liberals 
who recognize its origins.”). 
 46. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE PARTISAN DIVIDE ON POLITICAL VALUES GROWS 
EVEN WIDER 1 (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2017/10/
05162647/10-05-2017-Political-landscape-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZZ5-VAVG] (detailing 
the polarization of American politics). 
 47. See, e.g., supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
 48. Redneck Revolt, Vanguard America, the Virginia Minutemen Militia, and a number of 
independent defendants were named. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory 
Relief, supra note 7, at 7–15. 
 49. Press Release, Geo. Law Ctr., Georgetown Law’s ICAP Sues to Prevent Paramilitary 
Groups’ Return to Charlottesville (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/
news/georgetown-laws-icap-sues-to-prevent-paramilitary-groups-return-to-charlottesville/ 
[https://perma.cc/8SFL-JRFR]. The case ended in a win for Charlottesville after a state judge 
rejected demurrers filed by alt-right organizer Jason Kessler and Redneck Revolt. Ruling on 
Demurrer at 1, 19, City of Charlottesville, et al. v. Pa. Light Foot Militia, et al., No. CL17000560-
00 (Va. Cir. Ct., July 7, 2018), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/icap/wp-content/ 
uploads/sites/32/2018/07/2018.07.07-Letter-Opinion-Ruling-on-Defendants-Demurrer-to-
Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/26WH-UME5]. The defendants then entered into a consent 
decree prohibiting them from “returning to demonstrations in Charlottesville in groups of two or 
more while armed with weapons.” Melissa Gomez, Charlottesville Rally Organizer Agrees to 
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Legal academics have begun to face the issue as well. Prominent 
First Amendment lawyer Floyd Abrams noted that the white 
supremacists “will certainly claim that everything they did, everything 
they said, and every action they took was protected by the First 
Amendment,”50 and Alan Dershowitz claimed that “[t]he First 
Amendment was designed to protect this kind of unpopular and 
hateful expression.”51 Several recent and upcoming articles come down 
on the other side, arguing that state laws that prohibit armed protest 
are constitutional.52 
This Note argues for the validity of bans on armed protest through 
two novel constitutional arguments. The first is that gun possession—
even (or, perhaps, especially) at political rallies—ought to be 
categorically excluded from First Amendment coverage as expressive 
conduct. The second is that the First Amendment necessarily limits the 
Second Amendment by way of the Second’s “sensitive places” 
exception, which ought to be interpreted to protect those places where 
the presence of guns negatively impacts the exercise of free speech, 
including political rallies.  
 
Discourage Violence in Future Demonstrations, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/12/us/jason-kessler-charlottesville-violence-discourage.html 
[https://perma.cc/JNQ7-ZMMY]. 
 50. Leah Litman & Lark Turner, The Easy Take and the Right Take on the Charlottesville 
Lawsuit, TAKE CARE (Oct. 16, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-easy-take-and-the-right-
take-on-the-charlottesville-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/KW7S-YM7V]. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Katlyn E. DeBoer, Clash of the First and Second Amendments: Proposed Regulation of 
Armed Protests, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 333, 334 (2018); Eric Tirschwell & Alla Lefkowitz, 
Prohibiting Guns at Public Demonstrations: Debunking First and Second Amendment Myths After 
Charlottesville, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 172, 174 (2018); Timothy Zick, Arming Public Protests, 
104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3137374 [https:// 
perma.cc/C9HR-94ZB]; Kendall Burchard, Essay, Your ‘Little Friend’ Doesn’t Say ‘Hello’: 
Putting the First Amendment Before the Second in Public Protests, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 30, 
41–43 (2018); Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Arithmetic Post-Charlottesville: Sometimes One 
Plus One Equals Zero, TAKE CARE (Aug. 20, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/constitutional-
arithmetic-post-charlottesville-sometimes-one-plus-one-equals-zero [https://perma.cc/QEC5-
EU66]. For a survey of state laws regarding armed protest as of September 2017, see Alex Yablon, 
The 36 States Where Local Officials Can’t Ban Guns at Protests, THE TRACE (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.thetrace.org/2017/09/35-states-local-officials-cant-ban-guns-protests [https://perma 
.cc/P597-CNAQ]. 
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I.  THE FIRST AMENDMENT53 
The First Amendment is, perhaps, America’s most robustly 
enforced constitutional guarantee.54 The main thrust of its protection 
is that any government regulation of speech is presumptively 
unlawful.55 This Part first lays out the accepted First Amendment 
principles necessary to analyze the question of guns at political 
rallies—coverage and protection analysis, expressive conduct doctrine, 
and the Amendment’s categorical exceptions—and then applies those 
principles to armed protest. This Part ultimately concludes that armed 
protest is not covered by the First Amendment because it is not 
speech.56 
A. Background & Methodology 
1. Coverage and Protection.  Government regulation of speech 
may stand only if: (1) the speech falls within an excepted, unprotected 
category, which is to say that it is not speech within the Amendment’s 
meaning,57 or (2) the government satisfies a certain level of scrutiny, 
based on the nature of the regulation or the speech.58 First Amendment 
 
 53. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, . . . or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment has been 
applied to the states through incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 
268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 54. See Frederick Schauer, The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 2157, 2159 (2005) (book review) (“[A] robust First Amendment entails societal 
tolerance for what is potentially a not inconsiderable amount of real harm. American society, with 
its traditions and its history, has largely decided that it should tolerate this harm . . . .”). 
 55. Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”). 
 56. I do not analyze the question of armed protest under the theoretically applicable First 
Amendment right to assembly primarily because that right has “withered into a mere 
afterthought, nothing more than a historical artifact.” Nicholas S. Brod, Note, Rethinking a 
Reinvigorated Right to Assemble, 63 DUKE L.J. 155, 159 (2013); see also John D. Inazu, The 
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 566 (2010). Any attempt to characterize an 
action as assembly that could colorably be characterized as speech would be, at best, a waste of 
time. Second Amendment advocates should consider the fate of the Assembly Clause to be a 
cautionary tale about letting the Free Speech Clause swallow and absorb gun rights. See infra Part 
I.B.2.b. 
 57. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (rejecting the idea that 
excepted categories of speech are “entirely invisible to the Constitution”). 
 58. John A. Humbach, The Constitution and Revenge Porn, 35 PACE L. REV. 215, 223 n.44 
(2014). 
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scholarship refers to these concepts, respectively, as “coverage” and 
“protection.”59  
Utilizing this dual framework, courts first ask whether the First 
Amendment covers the conduct in question—that is, whether the First 
Amendment even “shows up.”60 For example, the First Amendment 
clearly “shows up” when the government censors a book, but is 
nowhere to be found when the government regulates a power plant’s 
carbon dioxide emissions. Even some actual speech stands outside the 
umbrella of First Amendment coverage.61 Fraud,62 criminal 
solicitation,63 and violent threats64 are all carried out through speech, 
but nonetheless may be proscribed without reference to the First 
Amendment.65 
If the First Amendment does cover the speech, the question 
becomes how much protection it provides. In theory, all speech that is 
covered by the First Amendment may nonetheless be lawfully 
regulated if the government sufficiently justifies the regulation.66 
Certain categories of speech, like commercial speech,67 and certain 
categories of regulation—namely, content-neutral regulation68—ease 
the government’s justificatory burden. 
2. Expressive Conduct.  For the First Amendment to cover (and 
protect) an activity, that activity must be speech. But not all “speech” 
is speech. While the Court has rejected “the view that an apparently 
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’” simply because the 
actor intended to express an idea,69 non-speech conduct may 
nevertheless be “sufficiently imbued with elements of communication” 
 
 59. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, 
Boundaries of the First Amendment] (noting the distinction between coverage and protection).  
 60. Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1613, 1617–21 (2015). 
 61. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). 
 62. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemktg. Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (“[T]he 
First Amendment does not shield fraud.”). 
 63. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal 
transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”). 
 64. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must 
be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”). 
 65. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 66. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 3 (6th ed. 2016). 
 67. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983). 
 68. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
 69. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
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to merit coverage.70 Therefore, while the guarantee of free speech 
obviously does not cover arson, rape, or trespassing, it does cover the 
burning of the U.S. flag,71 the possession of hardcore pornography,72 
and sit-ins to protest segregation.73  
The Court has developed a specific test for such “expressive 
conduct.” The First Amendment covers conduct when (1) the actor 
intends to convey a “particularized message,”74 and (2) it is likely that 
those who view the conduct would understand the message.75 
3. Categorical Speech Exceptions.  Even as the First Amendment 
covers some non-speech conduct, some actual speech falls outside of 
its ambit, represented in the popular imagination as falsely shouting 
“Fire!” in a crowded theater.76 Relevant exceptions include 
incitements, threats, and speech integral to unlawful conduct. 
Speech is unprotected as incitement when it aims to incite or 
produce “imminent lawless action” and it is likely to do so.77 Thus, the 
Constitution permits advocating the violent overthrow of the United 
States government, so long as the advocate does not specify that the 
revolution should begin immediately, or if the advocacy is unlikely to 
produce the sought-after coup.78  
Threats of violence are not covered by the First Amendment, but 
the mens rea required to remove a threat from coverage is an open 
question. Virginia v. Black79 suggested that speech directed “to a 
person or a group of persons with the intent of placing the victim[s] in 
fear of bodily harm or death” was not covered.80 Eugene Volokh 
 
 70. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974). 
 71. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989). 
 72. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969). 
 73. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966). 
 74. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. But see Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of 
Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (suggesting a “particularized” message is not necessary for 
First Amendment coverage). Some courts have continued to require a particularized message, 
while others have generated entirely new tests. See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1148–
50 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing the tests used in various circuits). 
 75. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11. 
 76. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing 
a panic.”). 
 77. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 78. Id. at 453–54. 
 79. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
 80. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
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therefore interprets Black to require a mens rea of purposefulness.81 
But, as Volokh goes on to note, “[b]oth before and after Black . . . many 
lower courts held that the First Amendment standard is negligence.”82 
Under a negligence standard, threatening speech would not be covered 
if a reasonable speaker should have known that their speech would 
inspire fear.83 
The First Amendment also does not cover “speech or writing used 
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”84 
Under this exception, the solicitation of a crime can be punished,85 as 
can, for example, the announcement of an illegal discriminatory hiring 
policy, because the announcement of the policy would further the 
illegal discrimination.86 Similarly, the First Amendment provides no 
defense when, in violation of a valid ordinance against outdoor fires, 
one burns a flag, even though flag burning is otherwise protected.87 
B. Application 
An application of the above principles to the question of armed 
demonstrations reveals that: (1) the possession of a gun, even at a 
political demonstration, is not expressive conduct under current 
doctrine, (2) expressive conduct doctrine ought to be construed so as 
to avoid First Amendment analysis of activities more properly 
analyzed under other constitutional guarantees, and (3) armed 
demonstration may additionally fall into one or more of the categorical 
speech exceptions. Accordingly, the government can tell 
demonstrators to leave their guns at home. 
1. Armed Demonstration Fails the Expressive Conduct Test.  To 
date, courts have refused to categorically exclude keeping and bearing 
 
 81. VOLOKH, supra note 66, at 222. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985) (“A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense 
when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists 
or will result from his conduct.”). 
 84. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949). 
 85. Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. 
REV. 981, 993 (2016). 
 86. Id. at 983 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 
62 (2006)). 
 87. Id. at 1010 (citing Bohmfalk v. City of San Antonio, No. SA-09-CV-0497 OG (NN), 2010 
WL 2303387, at *3–4 (W.D. Tex. June 4, 2010) and City of Columbus v. Meyer, 786 N.E.2d 521, 
529 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)). 
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arms from the First Amendment.88 Thus, an analysis of expressive 
conduct doctrine in action, as applied to armed demonstration, is 
merited. Here, courts’ rejections of attempts to justify weapon 
possession as free speech provides guidance on how to conduct such an 
analysis. 
In June 2010, Shawn Northrup was walking down a street with his 
family, handgun holstered on his hip, when a passing motorcyclist 
started an argument with him about openly carrying a gun.89 The 
motorcyclist called the police, and after they arrived, Northrup made a 
“furtive movement”—that is, he reached for his cell phone. The police 
officers removed Northrup’s gun from its holster, handcuffed him, and 
placed him in the back of a police car.90 Northrup was cited for “failure 
to disclose personal information.”91 Northrup raised a First 
Amendment challenge, contending that he “was engaged in symbolic 
speech by openly carrying a firearm in a holster,” which “expressed his 
opinion that Ohioans should exercise their fundamental right to bear 
arms.”92 The district court concluded that “the fact that Northrup . . . 
had to explain the message he intended to convey undermines the 
argument that observers would likely understand the message.”93 
Likewise, the Eastern District of Michigan rejected the First 
Amendment claims of “two young, heavily armed men . . . one of them 
dressed all in black and sporting sunglasses, and both carrying 
impressive looking rifles and handguns in full view,” who had been 
“briefly detained” by police in a twenty-minute encounter.94 During 
the detainment, one of the men stated: “I’m just exercising my First 
Amendment rights or my Second Amendment rights.”95 As to his First 
Amendment claim, the court simply noted that, “[b]ased upon the 
numerous emergency calls the City of Sterling Heights received from 
 
 88. See Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (“As the district court noted, a 
gun protestor burning a gun may be engaged in expressive conduct. So might a gun supporter 
waving a gun at an anti-gun control rally.”); Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11-cv-1129, 2013 WL 
4494481, at *9 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013) (“Gun possession may, in some contexts, meet [the 
expressive conduct] test and invoke First Amendment analysis.”), aff’d, 569 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
 89. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Div., 58 F. Supp. 3d 842, 845 (N.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d 
on other grounds, 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 90. Id. at 845–46. 
 91. Id. at 846. 
 92. Id. at 847. 
 93. Id. at 848. 
 94. Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 95. Id. at 886. 
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concerned citizens, it seems clear that these random observers did not 
apprehend that the Plaintiffs were” trying to convey a message.96 
A final example is instructive. Richard Burgess went to a pool hall, 
wearing a pistol in a holster on his hip, as well as a shirt “which quoted 
the Connecticut State Constitution regarding the right to bear arms.”97 
He also “had copies of a . . . brochure explaining [his organization’s] 
position on the legality of carrying firearms.”98 After refusing multiple 
requests to conceal his weapon, Burgess left the bar.99 Police had 
already been called, and he was arrested for disorderly conduct, a 
charge which was later dismissed.100 Burgess subsequently filed a 
complaint against the police department.101 The court held that, 
because reasonable officers could disagree on whether it was likely that 
others would recognize the man’s message, the officers were entitled 
to qualified immunity: 
While plaintiff’s shirt makes it more likely that those who viewed his 
overall conduct would understand his message than if he were only 
openly carrying his weapon, [it was unclear that his possession of a 
gun was a] particularized message regarding the Second Amendment 
rather than, for example, a weapon carried for protection.102 
As these cases indicate, gun possessors frequently fail to express a 
particularized message that others are likely to understand. Burning 
the American flag, with no other speech, clearly conveys a message.103 
Waving a gun in the air does not. An actor attempting to argue that his 
armed demonstration is protected expressive conduct would be 
required to show that viewers would likely understand the 
demonstration as expressive of a message,104 rather than as a threat or 
for self-defense. Such a showing is extremely unlikely because “[t]here 
is no way to effectively divorce the use of a gun as an instrumentality 
of violence and self-defense from any intended use of it as a symbol.”105 
Consider the confusion wrought by the rash of protestors who carried 
 
 96. Id. at 895. 
 97. Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11-cv-1129, 2013 WL 4494481, at *1 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at *1–2. 
 100. Id. at *2. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at *9. 
 103. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404–06 (1989). 
 104. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 105. DeBoer, supra note 52, at 345. 
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assault weapons to President Barack Obama’s healthcare town halls in 
2010.106 One such protestor told an interviewer that he carried the gun 
“because he could.”107 Another claimed he was attempting to express 
the message that “if you don’t use your rights, then you lose your 
rights.”108 The concerned reaction from bystanders, as in Baker v. 
Schwarb,109 indicates that those messages were not received.110 
Even when, as in Burgess v. Wallingford,111 the individual clearly 
has a political stance on gun rights, he will have difficulty proving that 
onlookers would likely view his gun as sending a message rather than 
as a tool of violence or self-defense. Thus, the idea that “[a]ctivists 
hoping to use guns as symbols may have more success convincing 
courts of their intention if they do so while demonstrating at a 
traditional march or rally”112 is incorrect.  
In fact, armed demonstration at a pro- or anti-gun political rally 
might constitute the weakest expressive conduct case: a potential 
viewer would understand the message only by explanation from the 
surrounding context, not solely through the actor’s conduct. The Court 
has made clear that explanation by actual speech—that is, by any 
protected First Amendment activity, such as signage—is fatal to an 
expressive conduct claim.113  
Despite the inherent difficulty gun possessors have in satisfying 
expressive conduct doctrine, courts have thus far been unwilling to 
categorically exclude gun possession from First Amendment coverage. 
 
 106. Mark Thompson, When Protesters Bear Arms Against Health-Care Reform, TIME (Aug. 
19, 2009), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1917356,00.html [https://perma.cc/
MPW5-Q4R8]. 
 107. Dozens Armed With Guns Protest Obama Speech, FOX NEWS (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/08/18/dozen-armed-guns-protest-obama-speech.html 
[https://perma.cc/5HFT-GSFY]. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Baker v. Schwarb, 40 F. Supp. 3d 881 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
 110. Interview with Gun-Toting Protester at Obama Rally Was Staged, CNN (Aug. 18, 2009, 
7:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/18/obama.protest.rifle/index.html [https:// 
perma.cc/P54G-4PRJ]. 
 111. Burgess v. Wallingford, No. 11-cv-1129, 2013 WL 4494481 (D. Conn. May 15, 2013). 
 112. Daniel Horwitz, Note, Open-Carry: Open-Conversation or Open-Threat?, 15 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 96, 115–16 (2017). 
 113. See Northrup v. Toledo Police Div., 58 F. Supp. 3d 842, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (discussing 
Supreme Court guidance in this regard), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by 785 F.3d 
1128 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 
47, 66 (2006) (“The fact that such explanatory speech is necessary is strong evidence that the 
conduct . . . is not so inherently expressive that it warrants protection under O’Brien. If combining 
speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a . . . party could always transform 
conduct into ‘speech’ simply by talking about it.”). 
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However, and counterintuitively, such a categorical exclusion would be 
in the interests of both advocates and opponents of broad gun rights.  
2. Let Guns be Guns (or, It’s Time to Limit Expressive Conduct 
Doctrine).  Despite rejecting the idea that “an apparently limitless 
variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person 
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea,”114 the 
Court’s own expressive conduct test contains no limitation on the 
conduct that might qualify.115 The Court has even conceded that 
“sleeping, arguendo, may be expressive conduct.”116 In fact, as a group 
of prominent First Amendment scholars recently opined, “[n]early 
every human activity can be cast as expressive in some way; nearly 
every conduct-regulating law will have some incidental effect on 
human activity that is not purely mechanical.”117  
But if individuals continue to press First Amendment gun claims, 
as the above cases suggest is likely, it may be time to limit the doctrine. 
When there is another constitutional guarantee directly on point, 
courts should avoid the temptation to analyze conduct under the Free 
Speech Clause.118  
For example, an individual who refuses to allow troops to quarter 
in his home by barring his door is clearly communicating a message 
that is understood by those who witness the refusal. Yet to argue that 
 
 114. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 115. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). That said, the burden is expressly on 
the actor to show that “the First Amendment even applies” in expressive conduct situations 
because “[t]o hold otherwise would be to create a rule that all conduct is presumptively 
expressive.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984). 
 116. Clark, 468 U.S. at 294–95; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1743 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that a wedding cake is “inherently communicat[ive]” because, in part, it 
communicates that “a wedding has occurred” (citation omitted)). 
 117. Brief of Floyd Abrams et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). Though slightly less prominent, the panelists on America’s best-
named legal podcast recently made a similar point. Tony Story, Mic Dicta (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://soundcloud.com/micdicta/episode-7-tony-story [https://perma.cc/XQF4-6ZS5] (discussing, 
at 14:35, the implications of a broad understanding of expressive conduct). 
 118. I essentially propose a categorical rule—carrying a gun should never constitute 
expressive conduct—that I expect to be the consistent outcome of courts that do apply the 
expressive conduct test to the act. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and 
Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 434 (2009) (“[B]alancing may eventually 
evolve into categoricalism through the usual mechanisms of common law. . . . Balancing may 
eventually calcify into a category . . . .”); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of 
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 (1992) (“A rule may be understood as simply the 
crystalline precipitate of prior fluid balancing that has repeatedly come out the same way.”). 
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the individual’s activity is protected under the First Amendment, 
rather than the Third,119 would be absurd. An indigent defendant 
demanding to speak to a lawyer is sufficiently protected by the Sixth 
Amendment,120 and when he refuses to incriminate himself, there’s no 
need for First Amendment protection because the Fifth Amendment 
acts as his aegis.121 Similarly, if an individual cannot justify his 
possession of a gun under the constitutional right to “keep and bear 
Arms,” courts have no business bailing him out with the First 
Amendment. 
The above examples evoke the very core of the respective 
amendment’s guarantee, and are thus ad absurdum in one sense. But 
to treat weaker or peripheral cases from other amendments as 
presenting strong First Amendment claims is an unwarranted 
constitutional lifeline. As discussed below, limiting expressive conduct 
doctrine when explicit guarantees apply would not result in the 
underenforcement of constitutional rights but would, in fact, 
strengthen the Free Speech Clause’s neighbors in the Bill of Rights. 
a. Limiting Expressive Conduct Doctrine Poses No Danger of 
Underenforcement.  Underenforcement is already a sensitive issue in 
the gun rights arena. Advocates frequently refer to the judicial branch’s 
gun jurisprudence with anger over a perceived lack of respect. Before 
Heller, they argue, the treatment of the Second Amendment was 
“embarrassing.”122 And post-Heller, gun rights are apparently still 
treated as “second-class.”123 
And of course, many of America’s most cherished (or most 
controversial) constitutional rights have emerged from the 
“penumbras”124 of the Constitution, where different rights, 
 
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. III (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”). 
 120. Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”). 
 121. Id. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself.”). 
 122. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989). 
 123. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent the Seventh Circuit from 
relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”); see also Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. 
Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (claiming that the 
decision below was “symptomatic of the lower courts’ general failure to afford the Second 
Amendment the respect due an enumerated constitutional right” and that “the Second 
Amendment is a disfavored right in this Court”). 
 124. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483, 485 (1965). 
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enumerated and unenumerated, are left free to interact and percolate 
to the surface in new ways. The rights to use contraceptives,125 undergo 
abortions,126 and enter into a same-sex marriage127 all emerged from 
this constitutional alchemy. 
As such, it is understandable that anyone seeking to safeguard civil 
liberties generally or gun rights specifically would be hesitant to draw 
ex ante limits on where in the Constitution litigants can seek 
protection. In reality, though, limiting expressive conduct doctrine in 
this way would not endanger unenumerated rights. Only those rights 
which have constitutional text directly on point should be excluded 
from expressive conduct doctrine. The rule would not preclude 
expressive conduct arguments about unenumerated rights.  
The actual unearthing of “hidden” constitutional rights reinforces 
this point. For example, the Court’s decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, which provided constitutional protection to the provision 
of contraceptives to a married couple, relies in part on the privacy right 
inherent in the First Amendment. However, that right emerges from 
the Amendment’s guarantee of association, not of expressive 
conduct.128 In Roe v. Wade, the Court invoked a right of privacy 
“founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty 
and restrictions upon state action,” with no reference to expressive 
conduct doctrine.129 Nor did the Court base its decision invalidating 
state bans on homosexual intercourse in Lawrence v. Texas130 on the 
fact that such intercourse is an expressive act, instead relying on the 
Equal Protection Clause.131 A test which merely limits the applicability 
of expressive conduct doctrine does not undermine the First 
Amendment ideals and principles upon which the above decisions, and 
others like them, are based. 
b. Limiting Expressive Conduct Doctrine Will Strengthen 
Guaranteed Rights.  Avoiding expressive conduct analysis will protect 
constitutional gun rights, not diminish them. Experience has shown 
that accepting other constitutional claims as free speech claims leads to 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973). 
 127. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2587–89 (2015). 
 128. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (“Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of 
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one . . . .”).  
 129. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
 130. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
 131. Id. at 585. 
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“a constitutional distortion.”132 Illustrative examples of weakened 
constitutional guarantees can be drawn relatively easily from the Free 
Speech Clause’s First Amendment neighbors.  
Strategic litigants frequently will attempt to portray their non-free 
speech arguments—such as those centering on the exercise of religion, 
press freedom, or the ability to assemble—as free speech claims. They 
do so because those claims are more likely to win, due to the rhetorical 
and legal strength of the Free Speech Clause.133 This process creates a 
feedback loop—more and more claimants are incentivized to 
introduce, and subsequently win, other constitutional claims on free 
speech grounds. Those wins create a body of good free speech 
precedent. Meanwhile, the neglected provision is unable to build up 
that corpus juris, and it is often left with more difficult claims that 
involve no communicative activity, creating a body of unfavorable 
precedent when those claims lose. The result is an “obscuring or even 
undermining” of the neglected constitutional text.134 Many suggest that 
this has already happened with the Free Exercise Clause, with 
“plaintiffs seeking religious protection frequently abandon[ing] the 
Free Exercise Clause and resort[ing] instead to the Free Speech 
Clause.”135 As a result, Mark Tushnet suggests that the Free Exercise 
Clause has been “render[ed] . . . redundant.”136 Patrick Garry adds that 
“free exercise, without any accompanying free speech claim, can carry 
relatively little weight.”137  
Just as the Free Exercise Clause has been weakened, if not 
devoured, by the Free Speech Clause, so too has the First 
Amendment’s express guarantee of the right to “peaceably . . . 
assemble” been undermined by the Free Speech Clause’s implied right 
to associate. As John Inazu writes, following the Supreme Court’s lead, 
“[l]ower courts have generally adopted [the Supreme Court’s] 
instrumental gloss on expressive association.”138 As a result, “[a] social 
 
 132. Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free 
Speech and Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 363 (2004). 
 133. See Schauer, Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 59, at 1795 (“[L]awyers 
representing clients with claims and causes not necessarily lying within the First Amendment’s 
traditional concerns have reason to . . . modify their core claims to connect them with First 
Amendment arguments, in the hope that doing so will increase the probability of success.”). 
 134. Id. at 388. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 71, 73 (2001). 
 137. Garry, supra note 132, at 390. 
 138. John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. 
L. REV. 149, 174 n.138 (2010). 
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group is not protected unless it engages in expressive activity such as 
taking a stance on an issue of public, political, social, or cultural 
importance.”139 The effect has been, essentially, a stealth repeal of an 
express constitutional guarantee by the judicial branch, which has 
replaced a broad but qualified freedom of public assembly with a 
narrow but robust freedom of expressive association. Similarly, Sonja 
West has argued in favor of “awakening the press clause” of the First 
Amendment and freeing it from the “constitutional redundancy” of 
being subsumed into free speech.140 West argues that the failure to 
provide particularized constitutional import to the Free Press Clause 
has led to “a serious weakening, if not an elimination, of our 
constitutional press rights.”141 
Gun rights advocates, who tend to have significant emotional 
investment in the Second Amendment,142 should fear a constitutional 
regime which gradually saps the Second Amendment of its vitality. The 
form of such constitutional vampirism143 is not difficult to imagine in 
the firearms context. Courts would, over time and in the aggregate, 
provide greater protection to gun toting that is more obviously 
communicative than instrumental. Are gun-rights advocates pining for 
a future in which the possession of decorative weapons is more likely 
to receive constitutional protection than concealed carry? 
Both advocates and critics144 of gun rights ought to reject the idea 
of protecting guns under the First Amendment. Both groups have a 
vested interest in Heller’s145 view of constitutional gun rights as 
focusing on “self-defense.”146 Advocates primarily want to avoid 
 
 139. Schultz v. Wilson, 304 F. App’x 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity 
v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 444 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 140. Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1027–28 (2011). 
 141. Id. at 1056. 
 142. Peter Moore, First Amendment Is the Most Important, and Well Known, Amendment, 
YOUGOV (Apr. 12, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/04/12/bill-rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/9KCY-6HUG] (“Republicans (27%) are much more likely than Democrats 
(6%) to say that the Second Amendment is the most important.”). 
 143. Schauer refers to this process as the First Amendment’s “magnetism.” Schauer, 
Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 59, at 1795. For an in-depth examination of the 
First Amendment’s interactions with other constitutional guarantees, see TIMOTHY ZICK, THE 
DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE (2018). 
 144. Those who seek to limit constitutional gun rights are also unlikely to be pleased with a 
regime in which a person taking an assault weapon to counter-protest a march by victims of gun 
violence garners more constitutional protection than someone defending one’s home with the 
family shotgun.  
 145. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 146. Id. at 599. 
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inroads on the core right of armed self-defense147 (maintaining the 
guarantee’s protectiveness), while opponents mostly hope to ensure its 
scope does not expand further148 (thus limiting its coverage). 
Application of the Free Speech Clause will weaken the protection of 
non-communicative gun rights, as it has done to neighboring First 
Amendment clauses, while at the same time expanding the coverage of 
gun rights beyond the core of self-defense. Ultimately, both sides will 
be dissatisfied. 
c. The Unique Difficulties Posed by First Amendment Gun 
Analysis.  Of course, an individual instance of gun possession might 
truly be both expressive and instrumental—that is, used to send a 
message and also to defend oneself. But a First Amendment analysis 
of gun possession has troublesome implications that strengthen the 
argument for a categorical exclusion of guns from expressive conduct 
doctrine. 
First, if expressive conduct doctrine was without this proposed 
limit, a particular act of gun possession might be protected by the First 
Amendment but not by the Second Amendment. In that case, the 
exceptions to the Second Amendment right listed by the Supreme 
Court in Heller—for example, prohibitions on guns in schools, of 
“dangerous and unusual weapons,” or of possession by felons149—
would be inapplicable. While the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
doctrine might readily handle a challenge to a law prohibiting guns in 
K-12 schools,150 it is unclear whether felons’ First Amendment rights 
should be so readily forfeit,151 or why a gun’s dangerousness should 
 
 147. See, e.g., Editorial, The Right of Self-Defense Is Fundamental, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 
26, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/the-right-of-self-defense-is-
fundamental [https://perma.cc/Y9FE-X5AA] (conceding that “[i]t’s possible to craft gun control 
laws that do not infringe on the right of self-defense” and acknowledging support for such laws 
despite pro-gun stance). 
 148. See, e.g., Editorial, Getting Control of Guns, WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/10/AR2011011006325.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WJ6-9J4Z] (arguing for “[r]easonable gun control” that “would not violate 
Americans’ freedoms or inhibit hunting or self-defense”). 
 149. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. 
 150. See Niziolek v. Upper Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 228 F. Supp. 3d 391, 398 (E.D. Pa. 2017) 
(“Under Tinker, schools may restrict speech that ‘would materially and substantially interfere 
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.’” (quoting Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969))). 
 151. There is, for example, already significant scholarly resistance to the Court’s 
pronouncement that the Second Amendment is about self-defense and the Court’s simultaneous 
exclusion of felons from that right. It is unclear why felons categorically do not possess a Second 
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bear on the legality of its use in conveying a message. At some point, 
the slope becomes slippery enough that the First Amendment will 
readily handle an extreme example—for instance, a prohibition on 
possession of nuclear weapons would certainly pass even the strictest 
scrutiny.152 But to conduct such an analysis concedes that the weapon 
is covered by the First Amendment, and risks the chance that at some 
lesser level of dangerousness, a judge will find that a certain dangerous 
weapon is also protected by the First Amendment. The categorical 
exclusion from Second Amendment coverage of “dangerous and 
unusual weapons” ensures no such risk exists under a Second 
Amendment analysis.153 
Second, the First Amendment analysis might be unnecessary 
because the Second Amendment may incorporate expression to some 
extent.154 For example, if the point of promoting gun ownership (on a 
broad or individual scale) is to deter violence in the first instance,155 
that deterrence is reliant upon would-be aggressors literally getting a 
message: “Don’t mess with me, or else.” Under such a deterrence 
theory, self-defense—the “central component” of the Second 
Amendment156—is expressive by way of deterrence before it is 
instrumental by way of violence.  
Alternatively, the Second Amendment might ponder an even 
more political message in carrying a weapon. If “[a] well regulated 
 
Amendment right if its core is self-defense. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions In 
Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 
1382 (2009) (“It is very hard to see how the felon’s interest in personal defense, in protecting his 
or her home and family . . . is diminished by his or her status as a convicted felon.”). 
 152. See R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny, 
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV. 291, 293–95 (2016) (laying 
out the standards for strict scrutiny under the First Amendment). 
 153. For a discussion of the categorical exclusions in the Second Amendment context, see 
infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 154. A similar but distinct argument applying expressive theories of law to the Second 
Amendment is found in Darrell A.H. Miller, The Expressive Second Amendment, in GUNS IN THE 
LAW (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript on file with author). Professor Miller’s argument is that 
“some element other than a simple cost benefit analysis concerning self defense is at play in 
making decisions about gun rights and policy.” Id. Professor Miller does not argue, as I float here, 
that the Second Amendment may itself protect some kind of expression without reference to the 
First Amendment.  
 155. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN 
CONTROL LAWS 20 (3d ed. 2010) (analyzing a “wide array of data” and concluding that “[c]itizens 
can take private actions that also deter crime”—namely, that “[a]llowing citizens to carry 
concealed handguns reduces violent crimes” and that “[m]ass shootings in public places are 
reduced when law-abiding citizens are allowed to carry concealed handguns”). 
 156. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (emphasis omitted). 
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Militia . . . [is] necessary to the security of a free State,”157 perhaps 
keeping and bearing arms represents an implicit statement to 
government authorities: “Don’t Tread on Me.”158 This “insurrectionist 
theory” of the right has been at the core of the National Rifle 
Association’s Second Amendment mythmaking for decades,159 and 
academics have taken it seriously as well, with David Kopel once 
referring to guns as “the tools of political dissent.”160  
If either of these theories is correct, the necessary import is that 
the application of First Amendment doctrine is unnecessary to 
adequately protect the sorts of expressive gun-related conduct that one 
might most expect to see. Rather, Second Amendment jurisprudence 
should be allowed to evolve and sort out these issues.161 In particular, 
because the deterrence theory assumes a simultaneous instrumentality 
and expressiveness to gun possession, the question of gun rights under 
such a theory would seem well suited to analysis under a constitutional 
guarantee that is not solely concerned with expression. This is 
especially so because the consequence of applying expressive conduct 
doctrine to the deterrence theory is an absurdly broad right to open 
carry in public. After all, the open possession of a weapon is meant to 
send a deterrent message, and the deterrence theory assumes the 
message is understood by all. Open carry would thus presumably be 
covered by the First Amendment. That is, unless the message gun 
possession sends is a threat. 
3. Threats, Incitements, and Illegal Conduct.  If armed 
demonstration qualifies as speech, it might nonetheless not be covered 
if it constitutes a threat conveyed with a culpable mental state. For 
example, armed demonstration might manage to convey a threat of 
 
 157. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 158. See Rob Walker, The Shifting Symbolism of the Gadsden Flag, NEW YORKER (Oct. 2, 
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-shifting-symbolism-of-the-gadsden-flag 
[https://perma.cc/A8WZ-5JLC] (detailing the history and symbolism of the Gadsden Flag and its 
“Don’t Tread on Me” language). 
 159. See generally JOSHUA HORWITZ & CASEY ANDERSON, GUNS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE 
INSURRECTIONIST IDEA (2009) (exploring, in part, the National Rifle Association’s advocacy of 
the insurrectionist theory of the Second Amendment). 
 160. David B. Kopel, Trust the People: The Case Against Gun Control, 3 J. ON FIREARMS & 
PUB. POL’Y 77, 103 (1990). 
 161. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth 
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .”); 
ZICK, supra note 143, at 203 (“The Second Amendment needs space to develop on its own, 
according to the interests and values it serves.”). 
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violent reprisal for contrary political views, as with the white 
nationalists in Charlottesville. To the extent that that message is 
successfully expressed—for example, when observers fear being 
“crushed like cockroaches”162—the relevant inquiry is whether the 
demonstrator had sufficient mens rea. 
If judged by negligence,163 armed demonstration would virtually 
always constitute a threatening statement. Many open-carry 
demonstrators state that their goal is to normalize or make people 
comfortable with the open carry of guns,164 which suggests a 
recognition that many or most people are uncomfortable with such 
displays. Thus, it would not be difficult for armed demonstration to 
meet a negligence requirement—that is, that the carrier should have 
known that his demonstration would inspire fear.  
If the required mens rea is purposefulness, then it would be much 
more difficult to argue that armed demonstration is a threat. One 
would have to show that the armed demonstration was directed “to a 
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim[s] in 
fear of bodily harm or death.”165 
There are undoubtedly some instances when armed 
demonstrators do intend to place victims in fear of bodily harm or 
death. Armed militias that counter-protest peaceful calls to prayer at 
mosques are one example;166 the explicit threats of the neo-Nazis in 
Charlottesville another.167 However, the surrounding context could be 
exculpatory. Whether the motivation of an armed march is expanded 
gun rights, collectivist redistribution, or lower speed limits, the 
collection of signs, banners, chants, and the like could help clarify the 
intent not to terrorize by explaining the presence of guns. 
Similarly, applying the incitement exception to armed 
demonstration would also be a heavy lift. There may be some cases 
where the evidence indicates that armed protestors or counter-
 
 162. Hermann, Heim & Silverman, supra note 17.  
 163. See, e.g., State v. Schaler, 236 P.3d 858, 867 (Wash. 2010) (requiring proof of at least 
negligence to prove guilt of threats under a harassment statute). 
 164. Anna M. Tinsley, Texas Gun Supporters Divided on Best Approach to Legalizing Open 
Carry, STAR TELEGRAM (Nov. 17, 2013, 8:56 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/
news/state/texas/article3836841.html [https://perma.cc/DDN3-8PTT]. 
 165. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
 166. Kurtis Lee & Jenny Jarvie, Anti-Sharia Rallies Around the U.S. Denounce Islam While 
Stoking Concerns Among Muslim Groups, L.A. TIMES (June 10, 2017, 9:00 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-anti-muslim-rallies-20170610-story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
XL3T-RJXZ].   
 167. Charlottesville: Race and Terror, supra note 7. 
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protestors are aware that their conduct may incite lawless action, either 
by emboldening their ideological allies or by provoking their enemies. 
But to lose First Amendment protection, a speaker must truly intend 
to incite lawlessness; the mere possibility or even knowledge that 
others will react violently to speech is insufficient to remove it from the 
coverage of the First Amendment.168 
Finally, some expressive acts of open carry may be excluded from 
coverage because they are integral to a violation of an otherwise valid 
general law. For example, where it is already illegal to carry certain 
types of guns in public, marching with those guns will not automatically 
shield the demonstrators with the First Amendment.169 Similarly, many 
states punish “brandishing,” the improper or threatening display of a 
weapon.170 Even if an armed demonstrator was “speaking” by waving 
his gun in the air, his speech could be properly excluded from First 
Amendment coverage as integral to the crime of brandishing, much 
like a flag burner who cannot escape a citation for illegal outdoor 
burning by invoking the First Amendment.171 
II.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT172 
The modern Second Amendment is still in its embryonic stages. 
Strictly speaking, the Supreme Court has held only the following: 
neither the federal government (Heller)173 nor the states (McDonald v. 
City of Chicago)174 may prohibit keeping a handgun in one’s home for 
 
 168. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969). 
 169. DeBoer, supra note 52, at 363. 
 170. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 790.10 (2018) (“If any person having or carrying any . . . firearm . . . 
or other weapon shall, in the presence of one or more persons, exhibit the same in a rude, careless, 
angry, or threatening manner, not in necessary self-defense, the person so offending shall be guilty 
of a misdemeanor of the first degree . . . .”). 
 171. Volokh, supra note 85, at 1010. A law against brandishing seems to target the very 
activity (waving the gun around) that would make the conduct expressive in the first place, and 
thus presents a much closer First Amendment question than a general ordinance against outdoor 
fires. But such laws predate the Constitution and have existed in harmony with the Bill of Rights 
since ratification. See BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 14, at 14–20 (identifying the extended 
historical record of laws against brandishing and similar restrictions). The absurdity of disrupting 
that harmony after more than two centuries of coexistence is a microcosmic illustration of the 
necessity of turning back the First Amendment’s aggressive expansion at the gates of gun rights. 
 172. “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Second 
Amendment was incorporated to the states via the 14th Amendment in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 173. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
 174. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791. 
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the purpose of self-defense, and the Second Amendment does not 
necessarily only apply to guns in common use at the time of the 
founding or guns most useful in warfare (Caetano v. Massachusetts).175 
This Part briefly explains the holding of Heller and the Second 
Amendment doctrines necessary to analyze a prohibition on armed 
demonstrations. It then seeks to demonstrate that, either under a 
historical analysis or because political rallies are “sensitive places,” the 
Second Amendment does not cover armed demonstration. 
A. Background and Methodology 
1. Heller and the New Right to Bear Arms.  In June 2008, the Court 
essentially forged anew an area of constitutional law when it 
overturned an unusually restrictive176 Washington, D.C., gun 
regulation, and held that an “absolute prohibition of handguns held 
and used for self-defense in the home” violated the Second 
Amendment.177 The Court waved off Dick Heller’s failure to establish 
why his desire to keep a pistol had “some reasonable relationship to 
the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”178 Self-
defense, not militia readiness, it turns out, is the “central component” 
of the Second Amendment right.179  
Because D.C.’s law was such an outlier, Heller’s extensive dicta 
have provided much of the guidance for lower court decisions since. 
Namely, the Court listed several types of regulations that it suggested 
were not called into question by its holding: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. 
  We also recognize another important limitation on the right to 
keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts 
of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” . . . 
 
 175. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016).  
 176. Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2009). 
 177. Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
 178. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
 179. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (emphasis omitted). 
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We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition 
of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”180 
McDonald, arriving in 2010, applied Heller’s holding to state and 
local governments.181 Because the law at issue in McDonald was nearly 
identical to the invalidated D.C. law, the Court did not expand on its 
renewed Second Amendment, other than to recommit to the above 
dicta.182 Questions thus left unanswered after Heller and McDonald 
include: 
• What arms may be borne, and what arms are excluded from 
Second Amendment coverage entirely?183 
• Who are the “people” to whom the right is reserved?184 
• Are there impermissible reasons to carry? Does gun possession 
have to be related to self-defense to receive Second Amendment 
protection?185 
• Does the Second Amendment extend outside of the home? Is 
there a right to carry in public?186 What even is the home?187 Is 
public carry limited to open carry, or is concealed carry within its 
scope?188 
• What tier of scrutiny is appropriate to analyze gun regulations?189 
 
 180. Id. at 626–27 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179). 
 181. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010). 
 182. Id. at 786. 
 183. See Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that “assault weapons and 
large-capacity magazines are not protected by the Second Amendment” (emphasis in original)), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 469 (2017).  
 184. See United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that 
unauthorized immigrants are “people” for the purposes of the Second Amendment). 
 185. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (concluding that 
the Second Amendment protects “the individual right to carry common firearms beyond the 
home for self-defense”).  
 186. See Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that there is 
no right to carry a concealed firearm in public), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1995 (2017). 
 187. See Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014) 
(holding that, for Second Amendment purposes, a tent is analogous to a home). 
 188. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 939 (leaving open the question of whether there is “a Second 
Amendment right for a member of the general public to carry a firearm openly in public”).  
 189. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Heller left open the level 
of scrutiny applicable to review a law that burdens conduct protected under the Second 
Amendment . . . . Our task, therefore, is to select between strict scrutiny and intermediate 
scrutiny.”). 
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In other words, the exact contours of the Second Amendment are 
very much an open question. 
2. A Familiar Tool To Help Explore the Terra Incognita of the 
Second Amendment.  With so little guidance offered by the Supreme 
Court, lower courts have been left to their own devices to determine 
the scope of the Second Amendment right. The resulting morass has 
been termed by some as a campaign of “massive resistance” to the pro-
gun Heller ruling190 or a concerted effort to treat the Second 
Amendment as a “second-class right.”191 Others have suggested that 
the confusion is an inevitable byproduct of the Supreme Court’s 
silence.192 
For instance, Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson has described Second 
Amendment jurisprudence “as a vast terra incognita” when describing 
“the dilemma faced by lower courts” in deciding “how far to push 
Heller.”193 Opting to “await direction from the Court itself,” Wilkinson 
wrote: “This is serious business. We do not wish to be even minutely 
responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the 
peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second 
Amendment rights.”194 Such considerations color the field on which the 
lower courts play.  
Despite the difficulty, one particularly useful—and familiar—tool 
has emerged from the fray: coverage and protection analysis. “[T]he 
most common framework [for courts analyzing Second Amendment 
questions] is a two-pronged inquiry that first asks whether a challenged 
law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second 
Amendment, and, second, if it does, whether the law satisfies the 
applicable level of scrutiny.”195 
 
 190. See, e.g., Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by Inferior Courts to Supreme Court’s Second 
Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673 (2014) (discussing “massive resistance” in 
“federal and state inferior courts” following Heller). 
 191. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about the Second 
Amendment being relegated to a “second-class right”). 
 192. Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921, 962 
(2016) (“The lower courts’ treatment of Heller is thus defensible under all the models of vertical 
stare decisis discussed above.”). 
 193. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 194. Id.  
 195. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY 3 (Mar. 
31, 2015), available at http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-Heller-
Litigation-Summary-March-2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8TX-5B7T]; see also Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 
194 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing the coverage-protection inquiry as “the prevailing approach”). 
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Even where courts undertake to apply this two-step test, the 
content of each step can vary drastically. To begin, it is unclear whether 
the dicta from Heller regarding permissible regulations—the 
“presumptively lawful” and “longstanding prohibitions” quoted 
above196—relate to coverage or to protection. In other words, the 
question is whether the government can prohibit guns in schools 
because guns in schools simply are not part of the Second Amendment 
right, or because the prohibition is justified by a compelling 
government interest. 
The answer is unclear because Heller points in both directions. 
Just before introducing the examples of permissible regulations, Heller 
says “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”197 
This, as the Fourth Circuit later noted, indicates that certain 
regulations impinge activities “beyond the scope of the Second 
Amendment”—that is, they are not covered.198 On the other hand, a 
footnote suggesting such regulations are “presumptively lawful” seems 
to indicate that such regulations could be unlawful under some 
circumstances, which would be the case if they were subject to 
protection analysis.199 For reasons discussed infra Part II.B.2.a, this 
dicta should be understood as exceptions to the right’s coverage. 
It is similarly unsettled what factors are relevant in coverage 
analysis. Some courts perform a historical inquiry into whether the sort 
of gun possession sought to be covered is analogous to a sort of gun 
possession which was thought to be traditionally within the 
Amendment’s guarantee.200 If the challenged regulation has a historical 
analogue of sufficient pedigree and similarity, the regulation is 
assumed not to even impact the Second Amendment right.201 This has 
its own logical issues. First, as Justice Breyer pointed out in dissent in 
Heller, the operative question is not “what 18th-century legislatures 
 
 196. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 & n.26 (2008). 
 197. Id. at 626.  
 198. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 472. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See, e.g., Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing 
the Second Amendment’s historical scope).  
 201. See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (“Heller II”), 670 F.3d 1244, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The scope of the right is thus determined by ‘historical 
justifications.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635)); Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and 
Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 918 
(2013) (“Keeping, bearing, or arms that are directly supported by history or have a colorable 
historical analogue fall within the protections of the Second Amendment text. Keeping, bearing, 
or arms that have no historical or colorable historical analogue do not.”). 
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actually did enact, but . . . what they would have thought they could 
enact.”202 Second, as others have pointed out, many of those 
regulations that Justice Scalia considered “presumptively lawful” due 
to their longevity actually are fairly modern. For example, prohibitions 
on felons carrying firearms were broadly promulgated in the 20th 
century.203 Similarly, prohibitions on carrying guns in schools are also 
of relatively recent vintage.204 In practice, most courts do not rely on 
originalism to analyze Second Amendment cases.205 
Rather, courts tend to refuse to answer the first question entirely. 
Instead, they merely assume, without actually holding, that the right is 
implicated, and move on to the protection question.206 Sometimes the 
decision to avoid the coverage question is framed as mandated by the 
lower courts’ limited role in the constitutional system. Lower courts 
simply do not know the extent of the Second Amendment right, and 
thus, when asked to decide whether a particular regulation implicates 
the right, they are necessarily forced to go beyond what the Supreme 
Court has declared to be the law of the land. Unwilling to do so, they 
defer.207 
The practice of punting on the coverage step has opened the courts 
up to criticism from gun rights advocates. Punting on coverage puts all 
of the eggs in the protection basket, and the protection step’s interest-
balancing scrutiny analysis runs closer to Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Heller than the majority’s historical categoricalism.208 In practice, 
 
 202. Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 203. See, e.g., Larson, supra note 151, at 1376. 
 204. Charles C.W. Cooke, Gun Clubs at School, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 21, 2013, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/338167 [http://perma.cc/B9UE-ZXGN].  
 205. Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine, 80 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 163 (2017) (“[O]riginalism has not been the primary means of deciding 
cases.”). 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is 
unnecessary to explore . . . the question of whether and to what extent the Second Amendment 
right recognized in Heller applies outside the home.”); Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768, 789 
(D. Md. 2014) (“[T]he court . . . will assume, although not decide, that the Firearm Safety Act 
places some burden on the Second Amendment right.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, and 
remanded by Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 207. See, e.g., Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (“There simply is no need in this litigation to break 
ground that our superiors have not tread.”). 
 208. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second 
Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (2012) (noting that lower courts “have 
effectively embraced the sort of interest-balancing approach that Justice Scalia condemned, 
adopting an intermediate scrutiny test and applying it in a way that is highly deferential to 
legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on guns being 
upheld”). 
MORGAN POST FC (DO NOT DELETE) 9/20/2018  1:12 PM 
2018] LEAVE YOUR GUNS AT HOME 205 
critics argue, “[t]he very fact that a court reaches the second step all 
but guarantees that the challenged law will survive.”209  
Why is that outcome all but guaranteed? In dissent in Heller, 
Justice Breyer predicted that “almost every gun-control regulation” 
would seek justification by invoking perhaps the paramount 
compelling government interest: “a concern for the safety and indeed 
the lives of its citizens.”210 Sure enough, “almost all Second 
Amendment cases thereafter” have relied upon public safety to justify 
firearm regulations.211 With that interest in mind, perhaps it is 
unsurprising that courts tend to defer to legislative judgments on the 
issue of public safety, upholding the majority of gun laws 
adjudicated.212 
B. Application 
Armed demonstration is entirely outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment right. Not only does it fall outside the historically 
understood ambit of the right, it also is removed from coverage by 
Heller’s “sensitive places” exception.  
 1. History.  As many have noted, Heller’s inquiry into the 
historical understanding of the Second Amendment right made 
extensive use of historical documents from “long after the framing of 
the Amendment [that] cannot possibly supply any insight into the 
intent of the Framers.”213 Justice Stevens derided Justice Scalia’s 
sources as “post-Civil War legislative history.”214 In fact, Scalia quoted 
material as modern as a treatise from 1891.215 Such materials, he said, 
helped “to determine the public understanding of a legal text in the 
period after its enactment or ratification.”216 
 
 209. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 
(No. 14-704) (2014); see also id. at 20 (“Time and again, courts have used this open-ended inquiry 
to constrain the scope of the Second Amendment . . . .”). 
 210. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 689 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)).  
 211. Ruben, supra note 205, at 164. 
 212. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1472 (2018) (calculating that only 
108 out of 1153 challenges have been successful, resulting in a nine percent success rate). 
 213. Heller, 554 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 214. Id. at 662. 
 215. Id. at 619 (majority opinion). 
 216. Id. at 605. 
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Setting aside the ongoing debate over Scalia’s interpretative 
method, Presser217 provides important insight, contemporary with 
sources used by Scalia, into the public and legal understanding of the 
Second Amendment right. “We think it clear,” the Court wrote, that 
“forbid[ding] bodies of men . . . to drill or parade with arms in cities 
and towns unless authorized by law, do[es] not infringe the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms.”218 Although the Court did not expand 
on why it was “clear” that the Second Amendment did not include the 
right to armed demonstration, its reasoning is evident in its First 
Amendment holding: 
The exercise of this power [to ban armed marches] by the states is 
necessary to the public peace, safety and good order. To deny the 
power would be to deny the right of the State to disperse assemblages 
organized for sedition and treason, and the right to suppress armed 
mobs bent on riot and rapine.219 
Under Heller’s historical methodology, such a pronouncement 
surely carries considerable weight,220 and it provides one basis for 
finding that armed demonstrations are outside of the scope of the right. 
As others have noted, many states have generally understood public 
demonstrations to be outside of the ambit of constitutional gun 
rights.221 
2. Sensitivity.  Heller’s statement that “nothing in our opinion 
should be taken to cast doubt on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings”222 poses obvious interpretive difficulty. The list is explicitly 
 
 217. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886). 
 218. Id. at 264–65. The Court then moved on to apply its “conclusive” answer—later 
repudiated by incorporation—that the Second Amendment did not apply to the states. Id. at 265. 
 219. Id. at 268. 
 220. The argument here is not that Presser is controlling law. Rather, Presser is useful as 
evidence of the historical understanding of the Second Amendment’s scope. That said, one might 
argue that because the Court provided two bases for its Second Amendment holding, and the one 
on which it relied has since become defunct, this language is now the controlling law from Presser. 
See, e.g., Ruling on Demurrer, supra note 49, at 18 (citing Presser in holding that the Second 
Amendment would not prohibit injunctive relief against the Charlottesville defendants). 
 221. See Tirschwell & Lefkowitz, supra note 52, at 179–80 (listing examples of state laws 
prohibiting armed demonstration); see also id. at 182 (noting that many states with preemption 
laws banning local regulation of firearms allow exceptions for the regulation or prohibition of 
armed demonstrations). 
 222. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
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illustrative rather than exhaustive,223 yet it provides little guidance for 
building out the rest of its contents. No broadly accepted theory of 
“sensitive places” has emerged. After analyzing how courts and 
academics have fallen short in attempts to create a coherent theory, 
this Part proposes such a theory.  
a. Heller’s Exceptions Are Coverage Exceptions.  The first step in 
developing a sensitive places jurisprudence is determining whether 
sensitive places are coverage exceptions or merely preordained 
outcomes of protection-level scrutiny analysis. As discussed,224 Heller 
points both ways on this question. When first introducing the 
exceptions, the Court noted that “the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited,” and that it is “not a right to keep and 
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.”225 This suggests that there are some gun-related 
activities that the Amendment simply does not “cover.” In a footnote 
after introducing the list of exceptions, however, the Court referred to 
them as “presumptively lawful.”226 “Presumptions” can be overcome;227 
there may be instances where “presumptively lawful” laws are not 
lawful. If that is true, then Heller’s list of exceptions is a protection-
stage inquiry.228 
Ultimately, Heller’s limits on the Second Amendment right are 
best understood as exceptions to coverage. In one respect, at least, the 
Court was extremely clear: “the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”229 Limits on a right are walls drawn 
 
 223. Id. at 627 n.26 (“We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as 
examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”). 
 224. See supra notes 197–99 and accompanying text. 
 225. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 226. Id. at 627 n.26. 
 227. See Presumption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A presumption shifts 
the burden of production or persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome 
the presumption.”). 
 228. See United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 472 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The Court’s use of 
the word ‘presumptively’ suggests that the articulation of sensitive places may not be a limitation 
on the scope of the Second Amendment, but rather on the analysis to be conducted with respect 
to the burden on that right.”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[The 
phrase ‘presumptively lawful’] may suggest the restrictions are presumptively lawful because they 
pass muster under any standard of scrutiny.”). 
 229. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. The Court also suggested that “[t]he First Amendment contains 
the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for 
obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular 
and wrongheaded views. The Second Amendment is no different.” Id. at 635. 
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around it, boundaries outside of which the right simply does not 
apply.230 The Court’s opinion demands an interpretation that some 
forms of gun possession are outside of the Second Amendment right.231 
The way that lower courts treat claims clearly within the exceptions—
for example, summarily tossing out Second Amendment challenges by 
felons with a quick cite to Heller232—suggests that this is the correct 
reading of the opinion.233 
The “presumptively lawful” language does not belie this 
conclusion. Regulations that fall outside of a constitutional guarantee’s 
boundaries are still only “presumptively lawful,” in that all laws are 
presumptively lawful under the rational-basis test.234 Such laws may be 
unconstitutional for reasons having nothing to do with the Second 
Amendment; a law creating gun-free school zones, for example, might 
run afoul of the Commerce Clause.235 
Therefore, those laws that prohibit the carrying of weapons in 
sensitive places do not implicate the Second Amendment. The task 
becomes identifying sensitive places. 
b. Lower-Court Attempts to Identify Sensitive Places.  Courts have 
mostly avoided straying from Heller’s text when dealing with sensitive 
places. Where possible, judges have relied on the “government 
 
 230. See Schauer, Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 59, at 1769 (“All rules—
legal or otherwise—apply only to some facts and only under some circumstances.”); see also id. at 
1765 (describing some speech-like activity as “lying well beyond the boundaries of the First 
Amendment’s concern”). 
 231. Just as some forms of speech are outside of the First Amendment right. See supra Part 
I.A.3. 
 232. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e simply hold that 
conviction of a felony necessarily removes one from the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ 
for the purposes of the Second Amendment, absent . . . narrow exceptions . . . .”); see also Brief 
of Plaintiff-Appellee at 12, United States v. Schrag, 542 Fed. App’x 583, No. 12-30344, 2013 WL 
1951148 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court and this Court have made plain that felons have no 
Second Amendment rights to possess firearms at all.”). 
 233. It is theoretically possible that the exceptions are only categorical in the sense that they 
are “crystallized” versions of repeated interest balancing, as in the process described supra note 
118. 
 234. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; see also H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: 
The Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 260–61 (2011) 
(discussing Heller’s treatment of the rational-basis test); Jason Racine, Note, What the Hell[er]? 
The Fine Print Standard of Review Under Heller, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 605, 637 (2009) (“As a 
result, the presumption created by a law extending only to sensitive places will be that of rational 
basis.”). 
 235. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561–62 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). 
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buildings” language to uphold regulations. For example, in Bonidy v. 
U.S. Postal Service,236 the Tenth Circuit confirmed that “the Second 
Amendment right to carry firearms does not apply to” post offices 
because they are federal buildings.237 The court further held that the 
post office’s parking lot was “considered as a single unit with the postal 
building itself,” and thus persons in the parking lot also had no Second 
Amendment right to bear arms.238  
Other courts have taken the ball and run, stretching the concept 
of sensitivity to its logical limits and beyond. In People v. Yarbrough,239 
the California Court of Appeals held that it did not violate the Second 
Amendment to attach criminal liability to the concealed carry of a 
weapon “on a residential driveway.” The driveway, according to that 
court, “was not closed off from the public and was populated with 
temporary occupants,” and was thus a “publicly sensitive place[].”240 
That decision’s supposedly self-evident wrongness has served to some 
as sufficient proof of the need for a coherent sensitive places 
doctrine.241 
Other courts have simply avoided the issue. In United States v. 
Masciandaro,242 for instance, the Fourth Circuit dodged the question of 
a National Park Service parking lot’s sensitivity by holding that the 
regulation did not violate the Second Amendment no matter whether 
the parking lot was a sensitive place.243 
c. Academic Theories of Sensitivity.  Unfortunately, despite the 
importance of this question to understanding the constitutionality of a 
significant proportion of gun regulations in America, very little ink has 
been spilled on sensitive places, even among legal scholars. 
Brian Whitman’s student comment suggests that a place may be 
sensitive “if there is sensitive information or material contained or 
conveyed in that place,” or “based upon the type or number of people 
present.”244 Whitman goes on to propose that, even in a sensitive place, 
 
 236. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 237. Id. at 1125. 
 238. Id. 
 239. People v. Yarbrough, 169 Cal. App. 4th 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 240. Id. at 314. 
 241. Brian C. Whitman, Comment, In Defense of Self-Defense: Heller’s Second Amendment 
in Sensitive Places, 81 MISS. L.J. 1987, 1993 (2012). 
 242. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 243. Id. at 473. 
 244. Whitman, supra note 241, at 2017–18. 
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the constitutionality of a gun restriction further depends on whether 
the place is public or private property245 and whether there is sufficient 
security provided.246  
Another student comment by Amy Hetzner suggests that, while 
the other listed exceptions in Heller are categorical exceptions, the 
sensitive places exception is akin to a “time/place/manner” restriction 
under the First Amendment, and that it “requires a flexibility not 
afforded by a strictly historical, categorical approach.”247 Hetzner 
proposes utilizing intermediate scrutiny to judge whether a law is a 
constitutional sensitive place restriction.248 
Finally, Jordan Pratt proposes a “First Amendment-inspired 
approach”  under which courts would look to the First Amendment’s 
treatment of a place in determining how the Second Amendment 
analysis should play out.249 For instance, Pratt argues that colleges are 
less sensitive than elementary and secondary schools in part because 
college students have greater First Amendment rights.250 With respect 
to government buildings, he suggests that public land “and any other 
public property where a broad right to carry firearms may have 
historically been permitted” are not sensitive places because they are 
akin to the First Amendment’s “traditional public forum[s],” under 
which the government has less authority to restrict First Amendment 
rights.251 For reasons discussed in greater depth below, although each 
of these theories makes reference to First Amendment values or 
principles, not one adequately protects those values from the presence 
of guns. A new theory is needed. 
d. A New Theory.  Any sensitive places theory has to fit the three 
factors from Heller: (1) some meaning of the word “sensitive,” (2) 
inclusion of schools, and (3) inclusion of government buildings. Schools 
 
 245. Id. at 2018–19. 
 246. Id. at 2019. 
 247. Amy Hetzner, Comment, Where Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an 
Individual Right to Bear Arms, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 381 (2011). 
 248. Id. at 378–79. 
 249. See generally Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s 
“Schools” and “Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537 (2014). Pratt argues that his theory 
does not consist of “clon[ing] and import[ing] in unmodified form” First Amendment doctrine 
into the Second Amendment, but instead utilizes “broad themes from First Amendment law.” Id. 
at 574. 
 250. Id. at 577–79. 
 251. Id. at 583. 
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and government buildings may be sensitive for different reasons.252 
Nonetheless, a theory relying on a common denominator between the 
two would not necessarily be wrong, and it might in fact have the 
advantage of a certain cleanness. 
One theme runs through each of the three proposed tests above: 
the First Amendment. Whitman proposes protecting “sensitive 
information or material,” especially in instances when “the 
information conveyed may be controversial or evoke violent 
reactions,” such as in “places of worship.”253 Hetzner kicks sensitive 
places to the protection question by comparing it to First Amendment 
jurisprudence’s time/place/manner restrictions.254 And Pratt not only 
imports First Amendment terminology, he argues that the Second 
Amendment should distinguish between places in, more or less, the 
exact same way the First Amendment does.255 
Between Whitman and Pratt256—that is to say, between 
considering First Amendment concerns and layering First Amendment 
doctrine on top of the Second Amendment—the former has the better 
argument. Borrowing so heavily from the First Amendment is an ill fit 
for the Second Amendment.257 Nothing about college students having 
greater free speech rights than kindergarteners indicates that 
undergrads should also have the right to carry a weapon to Philosophy 
101. The fundamental nature of the place has not changed in a way that 
merits the Second Amendment reaching into the room. In fact, college 
classrooms might be more sensitive than elementary and secondary 
classrooms, based on the controversial nature of the material conveyed 
in some lecture halls.258 
 
 252. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319 (M.D. Ga. 2011) (“A 
place, such as a school, might be considered sensitive because of the people found there. Other 
places, such as government buildings, might be considered sensitive because of the activities that 
take place there.”), aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 253. Whitman, supra note 241, at 2017–18. 
 254. Hetzner, supra note 247, at 381. 
 255. See Pratt, supra note 249, at 542 (arguing that “lessons from First Amendment doctrine 
counsel in favor of a narrow interpretation of Heller’s schools and government buildings” 
exceptions).  
 256. Because of the conclusion that the sensitive places exception was intended to be a 
coverage exception, see supra Part II.B.2.a, Hetzner’s protection-level test is inapposite. 
 257. See ZICK, supra note 143, at 203 (noting that the First and Second Amendments “pertain 
to very different activities, serve distinct purposes, and raise disparate regulatory concerns”). 
 258. See, e.g., Brian Slodysko, Indiana’s Butler University Faces Backlash Over Trump 
‘Resistance’ Class, CHI. TRIB. (May 5, 2017, 9:26 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/midwest/indiana/ct-butler-university-trump-resistance-class-20170505-story.html 
[http://perma.cc/A3KX-ASKN] (noting that conservative backlash to Butler University’s 
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Much of the focus on Heller’s “schools” example has been on the 
special vulnerability children have with respect to gun violence. 
Undoubtedly, the government has an interest in protecting children 
from gun violence. And because children are less able to defend 
themselves, perhaps the government has a stronger interest in 
protecting children from gun violence than in protecting adults. But the 
government has an interest in protecting everyone from gun violence—
as previously discussed, it is the paradigmatic interest used to justify 
gun regulations.259 Can it really be that schools fall into a categorical 
exception that other places do not when they invoke the exact same 
regulatory justification as those other places, just to a slightly greater 
degree? 
That reasoning defies our understanding of categories in the 
constitutional sense. Rather, the reason that schools are sensitive in the 
Second Amendment context is that guns have a special capacity to 
disrupt the school’s educational environment,260 thereby impacting 
First Amendment interests.261 Similarly, the introduction of firearms 
into government buildings threatens the ongoing viability of a number 
of First Amendment rights. If government actors must face down 
armed citizens in their day-to-day job duties, the relatively easy access 
Americans have to “petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances”262 will likely become much more circumscribed. 
 
“Resisting Trump” class included “social media posts revealing a phone number and photos of 
the course’s instructor”). 
 259. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 260. See, e.g., BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, GUN VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS 
AUGUST 2016 - MARCH 2017, at 1 (2017), http://www.bradycampaign.org/sites/default/files/ 
SafeSchools-Report_04-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XQR-R2UN] (identifying nearly 600 gun 
incidents in schools nationwide between August 1, 2016, and March 17, 2017, and finding that 
two-thirds of school districts conducted active-shooter drills in 2016). 
 261. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (“Our courts . . . have not failed to 
apply the First Amendment’s mandate in our educational system where essential to safeguard the 
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief. . . . [T]he First Amendment 
‘does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”); see also Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is deeply 
committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not 
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First 
Amendment . . . .”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402–03 (1923) (holding that a law 
preventing any person, including teachers, from teaching any language other than English before 
the eighth grade violated substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 262. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Accordingly, courts should adopt the following test: a place is 
sensitive under Heller when introducing guns into that place seriously 
threatens core First Amendment interests or activity.263 
To bite the bullet: this test suggests something akin to, although 
not exactly like, a positive obligation on the government’s behalf to 
enhance First Amendment rights, a position that has been anathema to 
the Court.264 But the heart of the argument—that the First Amendment 
has something to say about the reaches of the Second Amendment—is 
not unheard of. Professor Gregory Magarian has argued that “our best 
understanding of First Amendment theory and doctrine severely 
diminishes the Second Amendment’s legal potency.”265 But not only 
does the First Amendment cast doubt on a broad reading of the 
Second, the First Amendment places firm outer bounds on the Second 
Amendment.  
To understand why, consider the “marketplace of ideas” theory, 
which proposes that the First Amendment engenders an arena where 
truth wins out over fiction and the best cure for bad speech is good 
speech. The marketplace theory is central to our understanding of the 
First Amendment.266 If the Second Amendment cannot categorically 
exclude guns from places where truth-seeking debate reaches its peak 
intensity, then the First and Second Amendments are fundamentally 
incompatible. America’s classrooms, lecture halls, churches, town 
halls, community centers, parks, and political demonstrations are vital 
intellectual battlegrounds, but the war within and around those places 
 
 263. See GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1319, (M.D. Ga. 2011) 
(holding that a church is a “sensitive place” because the state has an “important governmental 
interest” in “protecting the free exercise of religion”), aff’d, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012); see 
also Burchard, supra note 52, at 42–43 (arguing that the First Amendment right to receive 
information from others’ expressive activity helps to inform a “sensitive place” theory that 
precludes armed demonstrations). 
 264. Monica Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
1473, 1507 (2013) (distinguishing “between positive and negative” theories of the First 
Amendment and explaining that “it is difficult to identify cases in which a court has held that the 
First Amendment requires affirmative action to enhance positive rights”).  
 265. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment 
Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 49 (2012). 
 266. See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (describing the First Amendment’s 
purpose as “preserv[ing] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail” (quoting FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984))); Whitney 
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our 
independence by revolution were not cowards. . . . If there be time to expose through discussion 
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”). 
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must remain one solely fought with words. The presence of guns 
threatens that speech.267 The only way to ensure the vitality of our 
national debates is a categorical exclusion of private gun ownership 
from the essential fora in the marketplace of ideas.  
To hold otherwise would be to create a massive subsidy in the 
marketplace of ideas. By constitutional fiat, those ideas that require the 
threat of violence to overcome reasoned dissent would be freely 
allowed to exert that threat.268 
If marketplace theory is true, one of three possibilities will result: 
(1) ideas that require the threat of violence to overcome dissent would 
start to win out over those not making use of that threat, (2) those ideas 
that were previously not reinforced by the threat of violence would be 
forced to accept the violence-enabling “subsidy” in order to compete 
in the marketplace, or (3) the persuasive value of the threat of violence 
would, at some point, in utter contradiction to millennia of human 
history, dissipate, and guns would become useless or actively unhelpful 
in winning political debates. The third possibility seems remote, and 
neither the first nor the second seems desirable. The solution is to 
protect the marketplace of ideas from guns, to the extent possible, by 
protecting from guns those locations most valuable to the marketplace. 
Political demonstrations are clearly “sensitive places” under this 
theory. First Amendment concerns are at their apex when citizens 
gather to protest and make their voices heard. Rallies implicate not 
only the right to free speech but also the right of assembly or 
association.269 Such events involve political speech at the core of the 
 
 267. See, e.g., DeBoer, supra note 52, at 358 (“Guns instill fear and chill speech that could 
challenge the ideas of the protester, and, according to philosophers like Milton, eventually bring 
about the truth through the crucible of the public discourse.”); Kenneth M. Mash, Guns on 
Campus: A Chilling Effect, THOUGHT & ACTION (Fall 2013), available at http://www.nea.org/ 
assets/docs/HE/TA2013Mash.pdf [http://perma.cc/R3NB-2WFM] (claiming that armed college 
students could stifle their classmates’ speech through intimidation and even create “a ‘chilling 
effect’ on faculty being willing to share any of their controversial research with their students”); 
David Frum, The Chilling Effects of Openly Displayed Firearms, ATLANTIC (Aug. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/08/open-carry-laws-mean-charlottesville-
could-have-been-graver/537087/ [http://perma.cc/FGG6-TFYZ] (cataloguing instances of armed 
protest, including one at a polling station, and noting that “[n]o other advanced democracy” 
allows such demonstrations). 
 268. If the basic economic assumptions of the marketplace theory are true, individuals would 
not seek to use guns to prove points unless the guns would add persuasive value. This Note 
proceeds under that assumption. 
 269. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the 
people to peaceably assemble.”). 
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First Amendment.270 Political demonstrations are the beating heart of 
the American story, starting with the Boston Tea Party, extending 
through the Civil Rights Era marches on Selma and Washington, and 
continuing into modern politics with the Tea Party rallies and the 
Women’s March.  
The introduction of weapons into political rallies is an obvious 
threat to the passionate expression the First Amendment mandates 
that we encourage by allowing such rallies. Carrying guns at a political 
demonstration risks either a chilling effect or an outbreak of 
violence,271 as we saw in Charlottesville, and as we have seen before. 
To preserve America’s vibrant political culture, the Second 
Amendment must concede the arena of political rallies to the First 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Gil Scott Heron opined that “America is now blood and tears 
instead of milk and honey.”272 But the truth is that America is both, and 
always has been. Such is the unavoidable irony at the heart of our 
national identity. America is Heather Heyer, yes, but we are James 
Alex Fields, too. We are Eugene Debs, imprisoned for mere speech, 
and we are his predecessor Hermann Presser, imprisoned for strapping 
a sword to Debs’ rhetoric. We are Dr. Cornel West, staring down the 
barrel of neo-Confederate assault rifles in 2017, and we are 
Christopher Cantwell, staring back. There can be no easy escape from 
our identity—only reckoning with it and managing it. 
Thankfully, the task is not impossible. As the American tradition 
of armed political demonstrations again rears its ugly head, we are not 
without tools to confront the challenges posed by those claiming to 
 
 270. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (“Speech is an essential mechanism of 
democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. . . . The right of 
citizens . . . to speak . . . is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a necessary means 
to protect it.”). 
 271. See John Culhane, Should Protestors Be Allowed to Have Guns?, POLITICO MAG. 
(Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/08/18/should-protesters-be-
allowed-to-have-guns-215504 [http://perma.cc/EAY5-27FB] (“[P]ublic safety and the First 
Amendment are powerfully linked . . . especially since we now know that [armed demonstrations] 
can chill not only the counter-demonstrators, but even the police. If they’re afraid to do their jobs, 
the First Amendment is indeed a hollow guarantee.”). 
 272. GIL SCOTT-HERON, Comment #1, on A NEW BLACK POET - SMALL TALK AT 125TH AND 
LENOX (FLYING DUTCHMAN RECORDS 1970). 
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operate within the ambit of both the First and Second Amendments. 
The Constitution is not so inflexible. 
We can, and must, engage in a war of ideas. But let’s leave our 
guns at home. 
